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1.  Introduction 
This paper reports on a ‘round table’ panel discussion that that took place at the 30th 
International Symposium on Money, Banking and Finance, at the University of 
Nantes, 27-8 June 2013. The conference was organised1 by the European Research 
Group GdRE (Groupement de Récherche European) on Money, Banking and Finance 
which is part of the CNRS (Centre Nationale de la Récherche Scientific) in France.  
As part of the conference, the UK’s ESRC (European and Social Research Council) 
and Bank of England sponsored MMFRG (Money, Macro, Finance Research Group) 
organised a ‘Round Table’ panel discussion on 27 June (17:45-19:00) with the same 
title as this paper. It has now become a tradition for the MMFRG to organise an event 
at the GdRE’s annual international conference, and vice versa. 
The panel was chaired by Andy Mullineux (Accounting, Finance and Economics 
Department, Bournemouth University Business School) on behalf of the MMFRG and 
consisted of: Leonardo Gambacorta (MED, Bank for International Settlements); Paul 
Mizen (Centre for Finance, Credit and Macroeconomics, University of Nottingham); 
Clas Wihlborg (Chapman University); and Richard Werner (Centre for Banking, 
Finance and Sustainable Development, University of Southampton). 
A review of the discussion follows an overview of the background to the ‘Credit 
Crunch’ that originated with the ‘North Atlantic Liquidity Squeeze’ (NALS) in 
August/September 2007 (Mullineux, 2008) 
2. Background to the ‘Credit Crunch’ 
In the run up to late summer 2007, bank credit supply was booming on the back of: an 
increase in the leveraging by banks of their capital, though issuance of short term asset 
backed commercial paper (ABCP) and secured and unsecured bonds and asset price 
inflation, particularly in housing, property markets and stock markets; which was 
raising the value of collateral underpinning lending and ABCP issuance.  
Additionally, securitisation, particularly of home loans and commercial mortgages 
through the issuance of mortgage backed securities (MBS), was facilitating an 
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‘Originate to Distribute’ (OtD) model; allowing banks effectively to ‘pass the parcel’ 
of loans originated.  Regulatory bodies and Finance Ministries were widely persuaded, 
with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) a notable exception, that the OtD 
model was facilitating the dispersion of risk across the financial sector, particularly to 
insurers, as well as the rapidly emerging shadow banking sector, so that risk was being 
beneficially and efficiently shared.  The development in the derivatives markets of 
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) created the perception that the credit risks 
were being insured and added an ‘accelerator’ to the process (Tett, 2009). 
In reality, it transpired that prior to the NALS, and the subsequent Global Finance 
Crisis (GFC) sparked by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there 
had been ‘over lending’ and ‘over leveraging’ and risks had not been insured as 
efficiently, or indeed moved off the banks’ balance sheets, as believed.  Pre-crisis 
bank lending was thus abnormal and the practices underlying it should not be 
‘restored’, as such. 
Further, the tax system contains a strong bias (IMF, 2010) towards debt financing 
because interest paid by businesses can be ‘expensed’, whilst the payments of 
dividends, out of after tax profits cannot.  This bias gave banks, at the fulcrum of 
credit creation, an incentive to leverage their equity capital as far as possible in order 
to increase their returns on equity to record post war levels and, in so doing, boost 
share prices and the value of ‘share options’ paid to bank management as part of their 
remuneration packages.  This major distortion has yet to be rectified.  The continuing 
dependence of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) on debt finance, 
particularly from banks, makes it politically difficult to remove tax deductibility 
entirely. 
The NALS involved the freezing of the wholesale, and particularly the interbank 
money markets, which most banks, other than local retail banks, had become heavily 
dependent upon for funding.  Central banks had to step in as ‘lenders of last resort’, on 
increasingly liberal terms, overturning the long established ‘Bagehot doctrine’ 
(Goodhart, 2008) and to remained engaged in providing liquidity to banks six years, 
and counting, after the onset of the NALS. 
This has led to the realisation that the risk weighted capital adequacy rules devised by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Standards (BCBS) needed to be completed by 
liquidity rules that require deposit taking banks to hold sufficient liquid reserves to 
weather a liquidity freeze of up to a month (the Liquidity Coverage Ratio) and to 
reduce their reliance on wholesale, relative to retail, deposit funding (the Net Stable 
Funding Ratio) (www.bis.org).  
The onset of the GFC, following the collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank 
in September 2008 led to an even stronger contraction of bank lending, or ‘Credit 
Crunch’, because it was realised that banks needed to ‘deleverage’ by increasing the 
capital to asset ratios through a combination of asset reduction and new capital raising.  
Banks that had been ‘bailed-out’ by governments using taxpayers’ money were 
required to halt dividend pay outs and retain profits to build capital; although 
seemingly excessive remuneration of employees, including large bonuses, continued 
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to be paid.  With access to bank credit declining and a recession ensuing, it was also 
necessary for households to ‘deleverage’ by reducing their indebtedness; which in turn 
curbed consumption and potential output growth.  Further, falling house prices in 
some countries, e.g. the US, Ireland and Spain, reduced household wealth, as did 
falling stock prices.  This in turn reduced the value of housing collateral underpinning 
outstanding loans and available to post against new borrowing. 
Larger non-banking firms seemed to weather the storm well, but hoarded ‘cash’, 
rather than invest in the uncertain environment.  Given their dependency on banks for 
finance (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999), SMEs, in contrast, faced a difficult economic 
environment and uncertain access to credit.  The ‘credit rationing of SMEs is to be 
expected under ‘information asymmetry’ (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), but the post crisis 
Credit Crunch introduced acute credit rationing.  Mechanisms for dealing with credit 
rationing include government sponsored loan guarantees and subsidised financing via 
development banks and agencies.  In some countries, including the UK, these were 
ramped up (see discussion of Paul Mizen’s Panel presentation below).  The guarantees 
can however prove expensive when default rates are high (Cowling, 2010). 
The monetary authorities responded to the Credit Crunch by cutting interest rates to 
close to zero and holding them there for an unprecedented period.  In order to 
maintain margins to cover lending risks, the banks did not pass on the interest rate cuts 
in full to SMEs.  Hence, although borrowing rates for SMEs fell relative to pre-crisis 
rates, they still remained well above zero.  However, with UK inflation persistently 
and significantly positive, the rates offered in real terms were low.  Nevertheless, 
opinion surveys showed that SMEs felt that they were facing credit rationing and that 
credit was expensive.  Whilst the supply of credit to SMEs is seemingly constrained, 
there is also evidence of declining demand for credit because economic growth 
remains low.  Many SMEs have in fact chosen to repay debt to deleverage themselves. 
In such conditions, Keynes (1936) described monetary policy as like ‘pushing and 
string’ and introduced the concept of a ‘liquidity trap’.  The central banks have tried to 
increase the pace of the economic recovery using unconventional monetary policy, 
dubbed ‘Quantitative Easing’ (purchases of government financial securities), or ‘QE’, 
and ‘Credit Easing’ (purchases of private sector financial assets, particularly MBS in 
the US).  This has been combined with attempts in the US to manipulate the ‘yield 
curve’ through ‘Operation Twist’, which entails varying issuance and purchases of 
government (Treasury) bonds of various maturities.  The overall aim has been to hold 
long term, as well as short term, interest rates down, since the longer rates have more 
influence on the cost of mortgages and debt financing for investment.  The 
concomitant rise in bond and other financial asset prices, however, increases the risk 
of capital losses by bondholders including commercial banks and insurance and 
pension funds.   
Keynes’ (1936) ‘liquidity trap’ describes a situation where interest rates are so low 
and (bond prices so high), that (almost) everyone expects them to rise, and thus to 
make capital losses on bond holdings.  Better then to hoard ‘cash’, or liquidity. 
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The central banks’ policy of providing an elastic supply of liquidity may thus 
increasingly become like ‘pushing on a string’.  To bring about a significant stimulus 
to the economy, banks must start lending the idle cash and firms hoarding cash must 
start investing it.  Improved ‘animal spirits’ (Keynes, 1936) will eventually, it is 
hoped, bring this about, and then the central banks will face the problem of extracting 
excess liquidity before asset bubbles and price inflation accelerate.  The persistently 
low long term interest rates may well already have stimulated ‘yield seeking’ asset 
price inflation in commodity and stock markets, and house prices inflation returned to 
the US in 2012 and the UK in 2013. 
The ‘bank lending channel’ of monetary policy (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999), 
however, remains impaired in the UK; and even more so in the ‘peripheral’, 
particularly the Southern, Eurozone member countries, due to the ‘fragmentation’ of 
the ‘money markets’ discussed by Clas Wihlborg in his Panel presentation.  Even in 
the US, bank lending to SMEs remains subdued. 
The observation that, despite the best efforts of the national central banks (including  
the European Central Bank, ECB) to hold down interest rates and pump liquidity into 
their economies, bank lending remains restrained, prompted the choice of the title for 
Panel discussion. 
Essentially, the question was: “under what conditions will the banking system resume 
‘normal’ lending, particularly to SMEs?” 
The new ‘normal’ will of course be different from the pre-crisis over lending ‘normal’ 
based on over leveraging.  It is probably also true that SMEs face not only a ‘credit 
(funding) gap’, but also an ‘equity gap’.  Indeed, for the more entrepreneurially 
innovative ‘growth’ firms, equity funding is more appropriate, but the supply of equity 
funding from the venture capital industry also contracted in the wake of the GFC. 
It should be noted that banks face relatively high ‘fixed costs’ of lending and thus 
prefer to make a smaller number of larger loans, to a large number of small loans.  For 
smaller borrowers, low transaction cost, credit provision, and also invoice discounting 
(‘factoring’ or ‘asset based lending’) over the internet, may be more appropriate.  For 
marginal borrowers, particularly those ‘financially excluded’ by credit scoring based 
bank and internet lenders; mutual financial institutions, such as credit unions and 
community development finance institutions (CDFIs), may be appropriate lenders.  
The banking system as a whole is thus adapting to fill credit gaps left by the 
traditional commercial banks; which are also loosing businesses to the capital markets 
as smaller firms gain increasingly cheaper access to direct debt finance from the bond 
markets.  A process of disintermediation is underway, with the ‘shadow banking’ and 
wider financial system filling some of the gaps left by mainstream banks. 
This is most advanced in the US, but also evident in Japan and Europe. Consequently, 
the ‘Credit Crunch’ may not be as severe as it seems. 
The bank regulatory authorities have been encouraging deleveraging by increasing the 
Basel risk weighted capital adequacy requirements, and most recently, particularly in 
the US, UK, and Switzerland, increasing or introducing non-risk weighted ‘leverage 
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ratios’; particularly on larger banks (Mullineux, 2013c), Banks have lobbied against 
these capital increases, arguing that they will raise the cost of capital and force them to 
cut back on lending, particularly to SMEs. Consequently, government policy is self-
defeating. It will prolong the recession and reduce the ability of banks to build capital 
from retained profits.  It will also make it difficult for banks to restore the very high 
returns on equity they achieved prior to the crisis. 
An alternative view is that it should not matter whether banks are funded by debt of 
equity (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), and indeed banks historically operated with 
much lower leverage ratios (Capie and Woods, 1991).  Further, to the extent that they 
are able to absorb more losses (by reducing dividend payments), banks will be safer 
and equity and bond financing will in fact become cheaper. To render banks safe, 
Admati and Hellwig (2013) advocate substantial further increases in minimum 
(equity) capital.  The real cost to the banks, of course, is the loss of the subsidy to 
shareholders and bondholders provided by the implicit government insurance of banks 
that are considered to be ‘too big to (be allowed) to fail’.  Raising capital requirements 
need not lead to a fall in bank lending, and may even make it cheaper, if it reduces the 
cost to banks of funds. Less leveraging will also reduce ‘risk shifting’ by shareholders 
to bondholders, and so encouraging shareholders to become more active stewards of 
bank risk management. 
The stark contrast between the pre-crisis credit boom and the post crisis Credit Crunch 
illustrates clearly that the bank credit creation ‘multiplier’ is not a constant, but instead 
varies with economic and financial conditions (Tobin and Brainard, 1963).  Whilst it 
is true that the bulk of ‘broad money’ is created through bank lending, or credit 
creation, rather than by central bank printing presses, the amount that banks can create 
depends on there being a demand for credit at the interest rates charged.  Broad money 
in the UK (e.g. M3 and M4) growth has been markedly slower after the crisis, than 
before it.  This reflects a tightening of lending standards and a decline in the demand 
for credit; in part due to households reducing their ‘debt overhang’, and firms paying 
down debts.  ‘Restoring’ the ‘bank lending channel’ thus requires finding a way of 
increasing the bank credit ‘multiplier’ from its current low levels. This involves 
increasing both the demand for and the supply of, credit, or bank lending. 
3. The Panel Discussion 
Leonardo Gambacorta illustrated that the bank lending channel had changed a great 
deal over the last 20 or 30 years (see also: Gambacorta and Marques, 2011) and also 
emphasised how the crisis had reminded us of the importance of liquidity, a theme 
picked up by Douglas Diamond in his keynote lecture at the conference 
commemorating 30 years since the publication of the famous Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) paper.   
Leonardo highlighted the major differences between cycles with and without financial 
crises and illustrated how monetary policy is less effective in a financial crisis (see 
also: Bech, Gambacorta and Kharroubi, 2012).  This explains the deployment of 
unconventional monetary policies, such as ‘Quantitative Easing’ (QE), in response to 
the GFC. 
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Whilst deleveraging in a ‘normal’ downturn is of little importance, a financial crisis is 
preceded by over-leveraging, and thus substantial deleveraging is required after the 
crisis (Bech, Gambacorta and Kharroubi, 2012).  In this situation over indebted 
economic agents may not consume more in response to lower interest payments, but 
rather seek to repay debt.  Moreover a struggling banking system may be not to pass 
on lower rates to the rest of the economy because of the need to restore appropriate 
risk margins and recapitalise from earnings retained from interest margins.  Leonardo 
argued that deleveraging achieved during a downturn following a financial crisis is 
ultimately beneficial for the subsequent recovery.  Whilst in normal business cycles, 
in which debt levels are not excessive, any increase in leverage would help to finance 
profitable investment projects and consumption; during a financial crisis, in contrast, 
such benefits are more than offset by the costs of failing to repair balance sheets.  In 
this case, he postulates, sectorial credit policies that aim to reallocate resources 
towards sectors that are most productive, and have not been drugged by the crisis, 
could be very helpful. 
Leonardo observed that, both as a legacy of the pre-crisis financial boom, and as a 
result of accommodative monetary policies in response to the crisis, the level of 
private non-financial sector debt is historically high globally (BIS, 2013).  Despite 
some progress in reducing private sector debt, particularly in advanced economies that 
experienced a significant accumulation of debt during the boom, balance sheet repair 
remains incomplete and is acting as a drag on economic growth.  Meanwhile, 
increased leverage in other advanced economies and in emerging market economies 
(EMEs), suggests the potential build-up of vulnerabilities in some regions.  Debt 
levels in ‘Emerging Asia’ are, for example, trending toward the peak reached before 
the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s.  Moreover, while debt levels are 
serviceable at current very low interest rates, what will happen when interest rates rise 
to positive real rates?  To service the debt at such levels, Leonardo concluded, faster 
GDP growth are required to reduce debt to GDP ratios. 
The ‘Growth Imperative’ that arguably led to, or at least significantly contributed to, 
the GFC (Rajan, 2010) is thus still with us. An alternative solution, given the current 
high levels of national debt aggravated by the operation of ‘automatic stabilisers’ to 
combat the ‘Great Recession’ brought on by the GFC, and the Keynesian counter 
cyclical fiscal policy interventions and bank bail-outs deployed to prevent a second 
‘Great Depression’, is to allow inflation to erode the real value of debt, as many 
governments have done in the past (Calomiris and Haber, 2014). 
Next, Paul Mizen illustrated the rationing of this supply of bank lending and the rise 
in the cost of bank lending in the UK.  Because banks had increased their ‘risk 
spreads’ following the crisis, lending rates to SMEs remained significantly above 
zero.  Supply and demand factors were at work and it was difficult to disentangle 
them.  SMEs are the most ‘bank dependent’ (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999), firms in the 
UK and pose the highest credit risk for lenders as they have little equity to absorb 
losses and the value of their collateral (often the family home) has become less 
reliable. 
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As regards ‘restoring’ bank lending, Paul asked, ‘to what?’; noting that banks over 
lent before the crisis.  Relaxation of ‘credit standards’ had led them to ‘under-price’ 
credit risks.  Nevertheless, there was an acute need to reduce the currently excessive 
credit rationing in the UK. 
The UK government responded to the Credit Crunch by reviewing its Small Finance 
Loan Guarantee Scheme (Cowling, 2010) and replacing it with the Enterprise 
Guarantee Scheme2.  HM Treasury and the Bank of England also tried to stimulate 
bank lending to SMEs, first through ‘Project Merlin’ (Mullineux, 2011 and 2012) and 
subsequently via its current ‘Funding for Lending Scheme’ (FFLS); which provides 
cheap funding for banks engaging in mortgage and SME lending.  The banks have 
shown much more interest in using the funding to advance mortgages, than SME 
loans.   
Clas Wihlborg, the third speaker, emphasised that the Credit Crunch was particularly 
prevalent in the ‘periphery countries’ of the Eurozone as a result of the ‘Doom Loop’ 
linking the sovereign debt crises to the banking crises; which was the topic of the 
Panel session at the 2012 conference in Nantes (Mullineux, 2013a and b). 
The pre-crisis single Eurozone credit market had ‘fragmented’, so that German SMEs 
could borrow much more cheaply than Spanish SMEs.  To get banks to lend more 
with lower risk premiums, it was first necessary to restore the health of banks.  The 
long term solution might be a Banking Union, although Clas Wihlborg’s view, shared 
in particular by one of last year’s panellists, Jean-Paul Pollin (University of Orleans), 
was that the Banking Union project was too grandiose and required progress towards 
fiscal and political unions that would take decades, rather than a few years, to achieve. 
In the short term, the problem of the ‘Zombie banks’, that are technically insolvent, 
but propped up by governments, needed to be resolved; even if common bank 
regulation and supervision under the ECB can be operationalized. Loss recognition 
was essential and bad debt problems had to be resolved; echoing Charles Calomiris’ 
(Columbia University) comments at last year’s Panel (Mullineux, 2013a and b).  Bank 
losses should be written down whilst establishing ‘depositor preference’; assuring 
depositors have seniority as creditors. This must be agreed internationally. 
Once the debts of bank creditors are written down in proportion to their seniority and 
residual bank losses have been realised, the banks would need to be recapitalised.  
Unfortunately, the banks most in need of recapitalisation often have the highest levels 
of their national government debt.  Forced transfers between Eurozone creditor and 
debtor countries, and their banks, seem inevitable (after the September 2013 German 
elections!).  Charles Calomiris also made this point last year (Mullineux, 2013a and 
b). 
The sources of recapitalisation funding were identified to be: domestic 
government/taxpayer; the European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM) and/or an 
enhanced European bank resolution fund (involving fiscal transfers between states); 
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and selling assets (deleveraging) in non-‘fire sale’ conditions, after the loss 
allocations. 
Clas Wihlborg had some additional observations regarding the proposed Banking 
Union.  Separate supervision of large and small banks might be sensible, but banking 
market competition distorting national supervisory favouritism and regulatory capture 
should be avoided.  Regulatory capture of the ECB by big banks should also be 
guarded against. 
Harmonising regulatory procedures might prove to be easier than supervisory 
practices and both needed to be embedded in legal systems. The UK and Denmark had 
made a good start on this.  International bankruptcy procedures, especially regarding 
government debt, are rudimentary and revolve around ‘collective action clauses’ that 
have been subject to a successful legal challenge in Argentina  (Wall Street Journal, 
2013) 
The logic of the EU’s Liikanen Report (EC, date) and the UK’s Independent 
Commission on Banking report (ICB, date) and recent US policy initiatives for the 
restructuring of banks into separately capitalised subsidiaries, at home and abroad, is 
that separately capitalised subsidiaries can be allowed to fail in a banking resolution 
process.  Separation of deposit taking from investment banking and trading activity 
(the ‘Volcker Rule’ in the US and the ICB ‘ring-fencing’ and Liikanen proposals) 
helps safeguard deposit protection schemes, which even if funded and underpinned by 
depositor preference, are ultimately underwritten by taxpayers (Mullineux, 2013c). 
Under the proposed European Banking Union, there would be a pooling of national 
deposit insurance schemes, leading German taxpayers potentially to pay out to 
depositors of banks in other countries; a de facto fiscal transfer union.  Strong 
prudential bank regulation and supervision is thus remains essential to protect 
depositors and taxpayers from abuse by risk prone banks (and their shareholders). 
Clas Wihlborg is an advocate of regulatory competition, believing it can lead to a 
‘race to the top’ (Wihlborg, 2012), rather than a ‘race to the bottom’, as feared by 
Kane (date), if implicit taxpayer guarantees, especially of the larger (‘too big to fail’) 
banks, can be illiminated using credible resolution regimes incorporating ‘bail-ins’ of 
creditors and depositor preference (Mullineux, 2013c) 
Richard Werner, the fourth and last panellist to speak, argued that a separately 
identifiable ‘bank lending channel’ of the monetary transmission mechanism, in 
response to a change in interest rates, as postulated by Bernanke and Gertler (1999), 
was a misconception because monetary policy always works directly through the 
quantity of bank lending, there is no separate interest rate channel. 
Banks are special because they create the vast bulk of the money supply (97%) by 
advancing loans and granting credit, which adds to the money supply.  Hence 
regulatory liquidity requirements have an important role to play, as Leonardo 
Gambacorta had argued, and Bob Diamond had emphasised in his keynote speech. 
Richard also favoured the simpler and more direct ‘credit guidance’ procedures 
because they are, in his view, the only bank credit regulatory measures with a 
9 
consistent track record of achieving the set objectives; such as avoiding asset price 
bubbles and financial crises. 
As an aside, we should note that 100% reserve banking has had some prominent 
advocates and is a potential means of stabilising banks; although money market 
mutual funds also had to be underwritten by the US taxpayer during the GFC.  To the 
extent that bank loans are permissible assets, with 100% reserves, they are fully 
funded by retail deposits and leveraging is curbed, which is why Irving Fisher (1933) 
was an advocate; and so too is bank money creation, and inflationary tendencies, 
which is why Milton Friedman (1969) was an advocate. 
Richard’s proposal for restoring bank lending is to clear non-performing loans from 
bank balance sheets, at zero cost to tax payers and society at large, through central 
bank purchases of impaired bank loans at face value. This would not amount to 
‘printing money’, he argues, since through this book keeping exercise the central bank 
is not injecting any money into the economy (defined as the bulk of the economy that 
cannot create money (Werner, 2005). Major central banks have, in Japan for example, 
have successfully implemented this policy before (Werner, 2009). Banks should then 
be encouraged to lend their excess liquid reserves to the national government under an 
‘Enhanced Debt Management Scheme’, whereby the government stops issuing bonds 
and instead covers its public sector borrowing requirements by entering into loan 
contracts with banks.  This would increase bank credit creation and hence stimulate 
new economic transactions without crowding out others, adding to the money supply 
and boosting nominal growth, and hence employment.  He believed that this was an 
attractive proposition for countries such as Spain and Ireland. 
Richard’s basic point is that bank lending is beneficial to growth as long as the 
borrowing is put to productive use; and as long as there are borrowers willing and able 
to do so, bank lending for GDP enhancing transactions should be maximised and the 
central banks should supply the necessary liquidity cheaply.  Non-GDP enhancing 
‘speculative’ lending in pursuit of non-productive capital gains, and purely financial 
transactions such as ‘churning’ portfolios, should be curbed, however. 
In such a world, the demand for credit, or rather the supply of potentially productive 
investment opportunities is a potential constraint on the ability of banks to expand the 
credit supply productively.  Nevertheless, there is a strong Keynesian case for the 
government acting as ‘borrower of last resort’ (Friedman, B.M. et al, 1991) when 
bank credit is contracting, as in many Eurozone countries currently. Richard’s 
‘Quantity Theory of Credit’ (Werner, 1997 and 2013), however, envisages an endless 
stream of potentially productive investments as he argues that human ingenuity has 
always delivered new productivity-enhancing technologies and innovations 
The discussion following the panellists’ presentations included responses by the 
presenters to the comments of the others and comments and questions from the 
audience. 
10 
Incentive compatible solutions, ideally in the form of contractual obligations, were 
necessary to stop ‘risk shifting’.  ‘Market capital’ in form of the hybrid debt/equity 
instruments and contingent convertible (‘co-co’) bonds was advocated. 
There was discussion of the advisability of the structural separation of retail, trading 
and investment banking activities, given that, if there were significant economies of 
scale and scope, it might introduce inefficiencies. It was observed that after all, the 
subprime crisis was a commercial banking problem aggravated by securitisation and 
derivatives, not a problem with investment banks per se. 
Basel II correctly supplements capital adequacy requirements with liquidity 
requirements, but the two sets of requirements must be made to interact and should 
not be seen as additively separable. 100% reserve banking would pass monopoly 
control over money creation to central banks, and potentially governments. 
There was agreement with Andrew Haldane’s (2012 and 2013) view that Basel II and 
III relied on over complex risk weighting systems based on the big banks’ own models 
and that Basel III was already being ‘gamed’ by the banks.  Leverage ratios are 
therefore needed as a backstop, as strongly argued in Blundell-Wignall and Roulet 
(2013). 
Concern was expressed that the addition of supervisory powers to monetary policy 
responsibility at the ECB will give it too much power.  Similar concerns have been 
raised about the accumulation of power at the Bank of England following the 
restructuring of the UK’s micro and macro prudential supervision of banks, and the 
wider financial system.  Against this, the US Federal Reserve has considerable 
powers, and the GFC had made clear that macro prudential policy involves interaction 
between prudential regulation and supervision and monetary policy, as long 
emphasised by economists at the BIS (Borio and Zhu, 2008; Cecchetti and Kohler, 
2012). 
One member of the audience, Dominique Lacoue-Labarthe (University of Bordeaux 
IV), had managed to keep abreast of events in the real world and informed us that an 
EU agreement had been reached overnight on credit burden sharing using creditor 
‘bail-ins’ in cases of insolvent banks; in light of the Cyprus experience and the 
preceding ‘bail-out’ (nationalisation) of the fourth largest Dutch bank, SNS Reaal, in 
February 2013, by the government of the Netherlands.  Full implementation and 
confirmation of the details, was naturally postponed until the German elections in 
September! 
Following on from Richard Werner’s proposals, it was suggested that the ECB might 
lend to the EIB in order to stimulate SME lending, much as the KfW, the development 
bank, does in Germany.  The UK, as Paul noted is in the process of establishing a 
partially state funded Business (lending) Bank, which is due to become operational in 
September 2014.  Further, the KfW opened a facility for SME lending in Spain in 
2013. 
In the parallel session, Laurent Weill (University of Strasbourg) discussed another 
structural issue, namely whether bank lending would be stimulated by entry of 
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‘challenger’ banks to increase competition, a policy the UK government has been 
pursuing without much success given the problems encountered by the Co-operative 
Bank in the UK in mid-2013.  It is possible that, just as competition may increase 
banking instability by reducing lending margins and profitability (Revell, 1975; Chick 
and Dow, 1997; and Chick, 2008), so it may discourage risk taking and thus curb 
SME lending.  It is notable that risk weighted asset based bank capital requirements 
potentially discourage relatively risky SME lending, whilst greater reliance on non-
risk weighted leverage ratios might offset this. 
The real challengers in the UK banking system are the credit scoring based internet 
‘peer to peer’ lenders, invoice discounters, and ‘crowd funders’.  ‘Relationship 
banking’ is still practised by regional banks in the US and Germany (Mullineux and 
Terberger, 2006), for example, but it is a dying art that should be fostered if SMEs, 
which are essentially local firms, are to find their funding needs properly met.  Local 
banks remain the most important suppliers of SME loans in Germany, but are 
beginning to suffer, as are mutual banks generally, from regulation designed to protect 
taxpayers from excessive risk-taking by larger shareholder owned banks (see 
www.savings-banks.com). There is thus a strong case for the separate regulation of 
local retail based municipal and mutual banks, that encourages relationship banking as 
opposed to over reliance on credit scoring.  The new EU supervisory arrangements 
provide for the ECB to take responsibility for large cross border banks and for 
domestic supervisors to take responsibility for local banks thus seems appropriate, 
though consistency across countries should somehow be assured. 
4.  Conclusions 
The question raised by the Panel was: ‘what does ‘restoring’ the bank lending channel 
mean?’  It was clear that the panellists did not envisage restoring bank lending to pre-
crisis levels, because the run up to the crisis had entailed a relaxation of credit 
standards in pursuit of historically high returns on equity by banks, egged on by their 
shareholders.  As the ‘credit cycle’ had reached its peak, leveraging had reached 
record levels and capital to asset ratios had declined.  A tax system that allowed tax 
deductibility, or expensing, of interest payments on debt, especially by banks at the 
fulcrum of credit creation, had incentivised this. 
The ‘new normal’, to which currently restrained lending should be raised, would be 
set in the context of risk based lending underpinned by adequate capital ratios.  The 
debates about: how adequate is adequate, and what is the role of risk weighting based 
on banks own models are on-going.  Banks should also make ‘forward looking’ 
provisions against bad and doubtful debts, accounting standards permitting. At the 
time of the conference in June 2013, the US banks were judged to be close to the ‘new 
normal’ following the US TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Programme) intervention 
launched on October 3, 2008 , than banks in the EU; were substantial bad and 
doubtful debts remain on the balance sheets and further recapitalisation and  
‘provisioning’ against them is widely required.   
It was further argued that this problem of ‘zombie banks’ must be tackled promptly, 
before the ‘new normal’ lending could be established.  This in turn will require 
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disentangling the Eurozone’s ‘Doom Loop’, which was discussed in the MMFRG 
Panel session at last year’s conference in Nantes.  The view thus prevailed that putting 
banks on a sound footing would reduce their funding costs and thus reduce the cost of 
their lending and help resolve the Credit Crunch.  The tax deductibility of interest on 
business, including bank, debt was a bigger issue to be tackled on another day, in 
another place. 
It was also noted that loan guarantees are widely used to reduce credit rationing; 
particularly as regards SME lending; for which credit rationing is judged to be more 
acute due to greater information asymmetry, lack of collateral, and the fixed cost of 
lending problem.  A number of countries, including the USA, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands allow income tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments, and the US 
has made extensive use of mortgage (home loan) guarantees in the post war period. 
The KfW in Germany has been particularly successful in providing loan guarantees 
for SME lending (Mullineux, 1992 and 1994) and is to extend its operations to Spain 
in response to acute credit rationing there.  The UK government revised its loan 
guarantee scheme in response to the Credit Crunch and has introduced a Funding for 
Lending scheme to provide banks with access to cheap funding for SME and 
mortgage lending.  It has proved successful in stimulating mortgage lending, but not 
SME lending and so a state backed Business Bank is being created.  The UK 
government also introduced a ‘Help to Buy Scheme’ to help first time buyers with 
small deposits to buy new homes, and, in mid-2013, it extended the scheme to provide 
US-style guarantees for mortgage lending to people seeking to buy older properties, 
but who can only afford small deposits.  The IMF (2013) has warned that the UK 
government risks stoking up a new UK housing bubble by stimulating sub-prime 
lending! 
Another possibility is for governments to encourage central banks to extend their 
‘unconventional’ monetary stimulus; potentially compromising their monetary policy 
independence.  It was proposed that the central banks should combine their money 
printing capacity with the retail and commercial bank’s money (credit) creating 
capacity to provide an elastic supply of lending in response to demand by 
governments and enterprises for economically, and perhaps socially, productive 
project funding (Turner, 2012; Lyonnet and Werner, 2012).  The supply of funding for 
non-productive, speculative, asset price inflating and bubble creating ‘investments’, 
and purlely financial trading, should however be curtailed; as part of macro-prudential 
policy, perhaps (Werner, 2012).  Let’s hope that a change in Keynesian ‘animal 
spirits’, combined with increased public sector led, perhaps via European Investment 
Bank, infrastructural project lending, can bring forth loans in response to a flow of 
good, productive, project proposals from SMEs.   
The on-going process of disintermediation will lead larger firms increasingly to fund 
themselves ‘directly’ via the capital markets, as in the US.  Smaller firms will 
increasingly find alternative sources of funding from the true new challengers in 
banking, over the internet. 
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